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Sex, Promotions, and Title VII: Why
Sexual Favoritism Is Not Sexual
Discrimination
by
MICHAEL J. LEvY*
Introduction
In 1988, David, a branch manager of a local bank, began dating
Theresa, one of the bank's tellers. After dating for several months,
the relationship between the two became quite serious. In 1989, an
assistant branch manager position opened up in the bank. Five tellers
applied for the position, including David's girlfriend Theresa. Be-
cause all five applicants were equally qualified, David, the sole person
in charge of promotions, faced a tough decision. Taking his relation-
ship with Theresa into account, David awarded the promotion to her.
Upon hearing of the decision, Patty and Peter, two of the tellers
who were not selected, sought the assistance of an attorney. With the
help of the attorney, the two sued David, Theresa, and the bank under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Act), alleging they were
victims of sexual favoritism. This Note considers whether Patty and
Peter should succeed in their claim.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. '"2 In claims of sexual favoritism,
plaintiffs allege denial of a promotion for which they were qualified,
* J.D. Candidate, 1994; B.S. 1990, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis
Obispo. Neat Allen Sawyer, J.D. Candidate, 1994, made significant contributions to this
Note by co-authoring the discussions relating to the meaning of "sex" in Title VII. To him,
I am indebted. I would also like to thank Professor Eileen Scallen for her thoughtful re-
view and insightful ideas. Finally, great thanks to Julius Erolin, J.D. Candidate, 1994, for
his never-ending role as a devil's advocate on the subject of this Note.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 253, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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because the decision maker chose an applicant with whom he 3 was
involved in a consensual, romantic relationship. According to plain-
tiffs in sexual favoritism suits, the decision maker's selection violates
Title VII because the plaintiffs are being discriminated against based
on their "sex."
Sexual favoritism claims are problematic, however, because the
meaning of the word "sex" in Title VII is unclear. The legislative his-
tory of Title VII provides little illumination as to the intended defini-
tion of the word.4 Given its ambiguity, circuit courts have come to
vastly different interpretations of the word "sex" in cases where plain-
tiffs allege sexual favoritism.5 Since the early 1980s, six reported cases
seeking Title VII relief for sexual favoritism have been decided. The
plaintiffs were successful in the first three cases,6 but the claimants in
3. In this Note, the decision maker will be referred to as a male, and the favored
applicant will be referred to as a female, for two reasons: (1) grammatical convenience,
and (2) because all of the reported Title VII sexual favoritism cases as of the date of this
Note involve a male supervisor and a female employee. See DeCintio v. Westchester
County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (male program administrator hired a
woman he was romantically involved with as assistant chief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825
(1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (male chief medical officer at jail
hired a woman he was romantically involved with as supervisory forensic-clinical nurse);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988) (male SEC supervisor discriminated
against female staff attorney); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D.
Penn. 1988) (male plant manager accused of sex discrimination against female unit supervi-
sor); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (male employer sexually harassed
waitress working in his restaurant); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983)
(male supervisor awarded promotion to a woman with whom he had a sexual encounter).
4. As the Supreme Court noted in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), the word "sex" was added to Title VII shortly before passage of the Act, leaving
the courts with "little legislative history to guide [them] in interpreting the Act's prohibi-
tion against discrimination based on 'sex."' Id. at 63-64. The Meritor Savings Bank Court
noted, however, that the legislative history did include opposition to the inclusion of the
prohibition against "sex" discrimination within Title VII. Id. Opponents of the inclusion
argued that sex discrimination was sufficiently different from other types of discrimination
to deserve separate legislative treatment. Id. (citing 110 CONo. REC. 2577 (1964) (contain-
ing statement of Representative Celler quoting letter from United States Department of
Labor, in opposition to the amendment), and 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964) (containing
statement of Representative Green, pointing to the inconsistency of members who voted
for this amendment but against comparable worth)). Besides this argument, which was
defeated, little legislative history was left to help define the scope of the Act's prohibition
against "sex" discrimination. Id. at 64.
5. Compare King, 778 F.2d at 880 ("[U]nlawful sex discrimination occurs whenever
sex is 'for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination.' " (quoting Bundy
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981))) with DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306 ("'[S]ex'
... logically could only refer to membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than
sexual activity regardless of gender.").
6. See King, 778 F.2d at 880; Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 576; Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at
1199.
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the next two cases7 were denied relief. In the final case, the court
found for the plaintiff on a separate sexual harassment claim and did
not reach the sexual favoritism question.8
In 1990, following the decisions denying relief, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released a policy gui-
dance for employers rejecting Title VII relief for sexual favoritism
claims where the underlying relationship was isolated, consensual, and
romantic.9 Professor Joan E. Van Tol has criticized the recent deci-
sions and the EEOC for not recognizing sexual favoritism as a distinct
form of sexual harassment under Title VII.10
While the current trend rejects sexual favoritism claims under Ti-
tle VII, the law is still very much uncertain. First, the two cases deny-
ing relief for sexual favoritism are only controlling for lower courts
within their jurisdiction. Second, neither the Supreme Court nor Con-
gress has spoken on the viability of sexual favoritism claims. Finally,
although courts follow the EEOC Policy Guidance, it is not binding
on them.1 ' Thus, while the current legal trend does not endorse
claims of sexual favoritism, the debate over the legitimacy of such
claims is very much alive.
The purpose of this Note is to show how Van Tol's criticism of the
current legal trend is misplaced and why courts should continue to
hold that sexual favoritism is not covered by Title VII. Based on the
language of Title VII, the EEOC Policy Guidance and the court deci-
sions denying relief have correctly stated that claims of sexual favorit-
ism do not give rise to Title VII relief.'2 Unlike other forms of sexual
7. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308 (denying relief where promotion requirements changed
allegedly to permit only hirer's paramour to apply); Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 501 (following
DeCintio in holding that preferential treatment on the basis of a consensual romantic rela-
tionship between a supervisor and an employee is not gender-based discrimination).
8. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1277; see also infra text accompanying notes 116-121.
9. EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-1 (Feb. 15, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance].
10. See Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under 7itle VII for Workplace
Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUs. REi. LJ. 153, 177 (1991) (criticizing the EEOC and the
DeCintio and Miller decisions for not recognizing sexual favoritism as a distinct cause of
action under Title VII).
11. The 1990 EEOC Policy Guidance (as well as the 1980 Guidelines codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations, see infra text accompanying note 17) is an administrative
interpretation of Title VII by the EEOC, the agency in charge of enforcing the Act, to
provide guidance to the courts and those employers covered under Title VII. The guide-
lines are not administrative "regulations" promulgated pursuant to formal procedures es-
tablished by Congress and are, therefore, "not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). However, the guidelines "do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance." Id. at 142.
12. See infra Part III.
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harassment, an isolated instance of a supervisor giving preferential
treatment to a person with whom he is romantically involved in a con-
sensual relationship, while perhaps unfair, is not gender-based dis-
crimination. 13 Thus, the purpose of this Note is not to refute that
instances of sexual favoritism have a negative impact on the work-
place,14 but rather to argue that with regard to sex discrimination Title
VII was enacted only to eradicate gender-based discrimination from
the workplace. 15
Part I of this Note provides the background for analysis of sexual
favoritism claims. The background unfolds in the following four Sub-
parts: (1) the early development of EEOC policy regarding sexual
harassment under Title VII; (2) the Supreme Court's acceptance, in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,16 of the idea that Title VII relief
should be available for sexual harassment that leads to noneconomic
injury; (3) the six reported sexual favoritism cases-from the early
cases which granted relief, to the more recent cases that have dis-
missed such claims; and (4) the issuance of EEOC policy guidelines
rejecting sexual favoritism as a Title VII cause of action. Part II of
this Note examines Professor Van Tol's arguments which lead her to
conclude that sexual favoritism should be recognized as a distinct
form of sexual harassment under Title VII. Part III refutes Professor
Van Tol's arguments and explains the reasons why the EEOC and sev-
eral courts have rejected, and should continue to reject, causes of ac-
tion for sexual favoritism.
1L Background
A. Early Development of EEOC Policy
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines identifying two distinct
types of "sexual harassment" qualifying as sexual discrimination pro-
hibited by Title VII.17 Although differing situationally, both types of
sexual harassment involve the same prohibited conduct, which in-
cludes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.' 18
The first type of sexual harassment is "quid pro quo" harassment.
Quid pro quo harassment arises in the following two contexts: (1)
when submission to the prohibited conduct is made, either explicitly
or implicitly, a term or condition of an individual's employment; 19 and
13. See infra Part III.C.1.
14. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 162-65.
15. See infra Part III.
16. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1604.11(a)(1).
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(2) when submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting the
individual.20
In either context, quid pro quo harassment can be explicit or im-
plicit. An explicit quid pro quo type of harassment occurs when em-
ployment decisions are made for or against an employee because the
employee granted or denied specific requests for sexual favors by the
employer. An implicit quid pro quo type of liability arises where the
employee was never specifically asked to sleep with the boss, yet all
women who have done so are given job benefits.2 Thus, with an im-
plicit quid pro quo type of harassment the employees are given the
implicit message that they must sleep with the supervisor as a term or
condition of employment. Since both types of quid pro quo harass-
ment concern the tangible, economic barriers erected by sexual dis-
crimination, they are explicitly prohibited under Title VII as
discrimination, which affects the "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of [an individual's] employment."22
The second type of sexual harassment identified by the EEOC in
the Code of Federal Regulations concerns harassment that leads to a
"hostile work environment."2 3 This type of harassment occurs when
the prohibited conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment."2 4
B. Noneconomic Injury Can Be Actionable Under Title VII
Although the hostile work environment type of harassment, un-
like quid pro quo harassment, involves noneconomic injuries and
would thus appear to be outside the purview of Title VII, the Supreme
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson25 explicitly adopted the
EEOC's view that this type of harassment violates Title VII.26 To be
actionable, however, the Court held that the sexual harassment "must
20. Id. § 1604.11(a)(2).
21. See Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that employ-
ees who reacted favorably to supervisor's sexual advances were given job benefits).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
24. Id.
25. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
26. Id. at 64. In Meritor Savings Bank, petitioner argued that Title VII only prohibits
discrimination resulting in an economic injury since the Act specifically prohibits discrimi-
nation with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment.
Thus, petitioner claimed, discrimination affecting the "purely psychological aspects of the
workplace" were not covered under Title VII. Id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 30-31, 34,
Meritor Savings Bank (No. 84-1979)). The Supreme Court swiftly rejected this argument.
See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' ''27
The facts of Meritor Savings Bank illustrate the type of conduct
needed to establish a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim. In Meritor Savings Bank, plaintiff Vinson, a bank teller, alleged
that the vice-president of the bank had sexually harassed her continu-
ally during the four years she worked at the bank.2 8 The harassment,
which ensued soon after Vinson began working at the bank, started
when the vice president propositioned her to have sex.29 Out of fear
of losing her job, she ultimately agreed.30 Thereafter, according to
Vinson, the vice president repeatedly made demands for sexual fa-
vors. Vinson and the vice president had sexual intercourse forty to
fifty times over the next several years.31 Vinson also alleged that de-
fendant had touched and fondled her and other women employees,
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occa-
sions.32 Defendant denied the allegations of sexual activity, fondling,
and demands for sexual intercourse.33
The district court denied relief without resolving the conflicting
testimony, holding that even if plaintiff and defendant did have a sex-
ual relationship, it was voluntary and unrelated to plaintiff's employ-
ment at the bank.34 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that Vinson
properly alleged a hostile work environment claim that the district
court had failed to consider.35 The court further held that if defendant
had made plaintiff's toleration of sexual harassment a condition of
employment, "her voluntariness had no materiality whatsoever" as to
whether a quid pro quo claim would lie.36
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to defendants. The
Court's decision could have been limited to simply reversing the dis-
trict court's decision on the quid pro quo harassment claim, since de-
fendant had conditioned job benefits on submission to his sexual
advances. However, the Court also chose to address plaintiff's hostile
work environment claim, accepting the EEOC's view that this theory
of liability was actionable under Title VII.37 The Court noted that
27. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
28. Id. at 60.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 66.
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plaintiff's "allegations in this case-which include not only pervasive
harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature-are
plainly sufficient to state a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual har-
assment." 38 In recognizing the hostile work environment theory,
thereby giving aggrieved employees another possible claim for sexual
harassment, the Court noted, "Title VII affords employees the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule and insult. ' 39 The Court remanded the case to the district court
for a determination of the veracity of plaintiff's allegations in support
of either her quid pro quo or hostile work environment claims.40
C. Third Party Claims of Sexual Favoritism in the Courts
In addition to providing for quid pro quo and hostile work envi-
ronment claims, the Code of Federal Regulations also allows for sex-
ual harassment claims by third parties.41 Section 1604.11(g) of Title 29
states, "Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted be-
cause of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances
or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for un-
lawful sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for
but denied that employment opportunity or benefit." 42 It is through
this language in Section 1604.11(g) that third parties have made claims
of sexual favoritism under Title VII.
However, claims of sexual favoritism should not be actionable
under Title VII through Section 1604.11(g) because in such cases the
underlying employer-employee relationship is consensual and there-
fore does not involve discrimination based on gender. The underlying
relationship in a sexual favoritism case is one that is consensual in the
sense that the participants want to be with each other and are in-
volved in a relationship with no employment strings attached. A cog-
nizable claim of sexual harassment under Section 1604.11(g), however,
could involve a relationship which is voluntary in the sense that the
employee is not in the relationship against her will, yet is nonconsen-
sual because the employee is "submitting" to sexual advances in re-
turn for employment benefits. Thus, for purposes of this Note, use of
the term "sexual favoritism" automatically assumes that the underly-
ing sexual relationship is consensual, and distinct from any other ex-
isting claims of sexual harassment.
38. Id. at 67.
39. Id. at 65.
40. Id. at 73.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993).
42. Id.
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Three early cases, Toscano v. Nimmo,43 King v. Palmer,44 and
Priest v. Rotary,45 relied on Section 1604.11(g) in allowing claims for
sexual favoritism. However, such reliance in these three cases can be
undermined as improper,46 dicta, 47 and unnecessary. 48 These cases
are discussed in turn below. This Part then discusses the three re-
maining reported Title VII sexual favoritism cases.
(1) Toscano v. Nimmo
In Toscano v. Nimmo, the trial court determined the correct out-
come of the case, but in so doing incorrectly relied on Section
1604.11(g); this section is inapplicable to the facts of Toscano because
the sexual favoritism stemmed from a consensual relationship. Plain-
tiff Toscano applied for a promotion at the Veterans' Administration
Hospital in Elsmere, Delaware. 49 Toscano was one of five individu-
als 50 deemed qualified for the position by the hospital's personnel de-
partment.51 The promotion eventually went to a woman with whom
the decision maker had had a sexual encounter.52 Toscano sued alleg-
ing that in order for a woman to be selected for the promotion it was
necessary for that woman to grant sexual favors, a condition not im-
posed on men.5 3 However, rather than establishing that she had re-
fused specific requests for sexual favors,5 4 Toscano instead offered
evidence showing that the supervisor intended to reward those em-
ployees who granted him sexual favors.55 The evidence accepted by
the trial court included: (1) that at the beginning of the affair between
the favored woman and the supervisor, the supervisor had questioned
her regarding her career goals at the hospital;56 (2) that the supervisor
had propositioned two other female employees; 57 (3) that he had tele-
phoned the plaintiff to tell her about a sexual encounter he had just
43. 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).
44. 598 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
45. 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
46. See Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1197; infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
47. See King, 598 F. Supp. at 65; infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
48. See Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 571; infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
49. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1198.
50. The written opinion fails to specify the ratio of men to women with regard to the
five individuals seeking the promotion. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1198-99.
54. The refusal of specific requests for sexual favors which results in employment
ramifications would form the basis of an explicit quid pro quo theory of liability under
§ 1604.11(a)(1). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993).
55. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
56. Id. at 1200.
57. Id. at 1199-1200.
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had with the favored woman and to tell her that he planned to pro-
mote this woman because she was "very good in making him feel
good";58 and (4) that the supervisor had placed his hands on the plain-
tiff, and another woman, in a suggestive manner and had made sug-
gestive remarks.59 Citing Section 1604.11(g) for support, the trial
court held that the plaintiff had stated a viable cause of action under
Title VII.60
While the trial court correctly held that the supervisor had vio-
lated Title VII, the court erred by relying on Section 1604.11(g).
Plaintiff Toscano never established a Title VII violation supported by
Section 1604.11(g) because the section hinges on the underlying rela-
tionship being nonconsensua 61 and there was no evidence suggesting
that the relationship between the supervisor and the favored woman
was coercive. While the court's reasoning may have been flawed, ulti-
mately the court's holding in Toscano was correct because the facts
presented established a Title VII violation under an implicit quid pro
quo theory.6 2 Since the consent of the favored woman is irrelevant to
a claim of implicit quid pro quo harassment, the plaintiff need only
show that the granting of sexual favors was made a condition to get-
ting the promotion.6 3 As the four findings above show, there was sub-
stantial evidence that the supervisor had conditioned the promotion
on the receipt of sexual favors.
(2) King v. Palmer
The second case, King v. Palmer, involved a claim by plaintiff
King for Title VII relief based on the denial of a promotion while
serving as a nurse at the District of Columbia jail. The promotion
went to a less qualified nurse who was having a sexual relationship
with the doctor in charge of the promotion.64 The district court noted
that the plaintiff's claim was different from the traditional sexual har-
assment suit in that the plaintiff did not assert she was the target of
the defendant's sexual conduct.65 However, the court stated, the "the-
ory of the violation is the same: 'sex [was] for no legitimate reason a
substantial factor in the discrimination."' 66 The court relied on both
58. Id. at 1201.
59. Id. at 1200.
60. Id. at 1199.
61. For further discussion of Title VII liability under Section 1604.11(g), see infra text
accompanying notes 94-106, 125-126.
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993). For further discussion of an implicit quid
pro quo theory of liability, see supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1); EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9, at D-1.
64. King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65, 66 (D.D.C. 1984).
65. Id.
66. Il. at 66-67 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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Section 1604.11(g) and the year-old Toscano decision in holding that
the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of sexual discrimination. 67
Nevertheless, the court ultimately found for the defendant because
the plaintiff had failed to produce direct evidence of an "explicit sex-
ual relationship" between the supervising doctor and the favored
employee.68
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal held
that the district court had improperly required the plaintiff to produce
direct evidence of a consummated sexual relationship between the
doctor and the promoted nurse, and remanded the case for an appro-
priate remedy.69 The court of appeal agreed "with the District Court's
conclusion and its rationale: that unlawful sex discrimination occurs
whenever sex is 'for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the
discrimination." 70
Although the language of King suggests that the court was em-
bracing Title VII relief for claims of sexual favoritism based on a con-
sensual relationship, this language is dicta. The court noted at the
outset, the "parties agree that Ms. King's allegation, based as it is on
the sexual relationship between Ms. Grant and [defendant] Dr. Smith,
presents a cognizable cause of action under statutes prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment."'71 Thus, since both parties agreed that
sexual favoritism was a viable cause of action under Title VII, the is-
sue was not before the court. Further, in denying a rehearing en banc
and a request by the government for an extension of time to file a
brief as amicus curiae72 to address concerns that the panel's decision
"may represent a significant expansion of Title VII coverage," six
judges emphasized that the applicability of Title VII to the facts
before them was not raised on appeal.73 "Because the point was not
before the panel on appeal, there [was] no occasion to address the
issue en banc. '' 74 Thus, although Van Tol praises the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeal for recognizing the plaintiff's genu-
ine 75 sexual favoritism claim, the issue was not resolved because the
sexual favoritism claim was never raised on appeal by the defendant.
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id. at 68.
69. King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 880 (quoting Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942-43).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. The opinion does not specify which government agency sought the rehearing en
banc. Id. at 883.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. This case represents a genuine sexual favoritism case in the sense that it is the only
reported decision allowing Title VII relief where (1) the underlying relationship was con-
sensual and romantic, and (2) the supervisor made no sexual advances towards other em-
ployees (i.e., the event was isolated).
[Vol. 45
(3) Priest v. Rotary
In the third case, Priest v. Rotary, the plaintiff was fired from her
job as a waitress at a coffee shop owned by the defendant.76 She took
issue with her firing and sued her employer for sexual harassment.
The district court found that during her employment the plaintiff and
other female employees were subjected to various instances of unwel-
come sexual advances by the defendant.77 Those who objected to his
conduct either quit their jobs for fear that the conduct would continue
or were fired, as was the case with plaintiff and a co-worker. 78 Those
employees who did not reject the defendant's advances, including the
woman with whom defendant was having a sexual relationship, were
given preference in shift assignments, station assignments, and vaca-
tion benefits, and were excepted from cleanup duties.79 Based on
these findings, the court held for the plaintiff on over twenty different
grounds.80 In its discussion the court cited Toscano in holding that
defendant violated Title VII by giving preferential treatment to the
woman with whom he was romantically involved.81
Although this case may appear to involve sexual favoritism, and
the court used language regarding preferential treatment, it is note-
worthy that defendant's conduct fell within both of the traditional
forms of sexual harassment82 First, the defendant created a severely
hostile and offensive work environment through the numerous sexual
advances made upon the various female employees. 83 Second, the de-
fendant granted job benefits to those female employees who endured
his sexual advances and misconduct, forming an implicit quid pro quo
claim of harassment.84 By doing so, the defendant sent a clear
message to female employees, including plaintiff, that they must ac-
cede to his sexual advances to avoid termination from employment.
Unlike the paradigm case involving a claim for sexual favoritism, in
which the defendant gives preferential treatment to only the one wo-
man with whom he is romantically involved, the defendant in Priest
76. Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
77. Unwelcome sexual advances by defendant against plaintiff included (1) placing his
hands on plaintiff's breasts, (2) trying to kiss her on the neck, (3) rubbing his body against
plaintiff, (4) unzipping the front of her uniform, and (5) exposing his genitals to both plain-
tiff and a co-worker. Id. at 574-75.
78. Id. at 575-76.
79. Id. at 576.
80. Id. at 581-82.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
83. Id. at 524-25; see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1993) (prohibiting hostile work envi-
ronment discrimination).
84. Id. at 576; see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993) (prohibiting quid pro quo harass-
ment). For further discussion of this type of Title VII liability, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 19-22.
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gave job benefits to any female employee who tolerated his sexual
misconduct. Thus, the court need not have discussed sexual favoritism
as the factual findings more aptly supported an implicit quid pro quo
claim of harassment.
(4) DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center
Soon after the Toscano, Priest, and King decisions the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals decided DeCintio v. Westchester County
Medical Center85 and rejected the view that sexual favoritism is cov-
ered by Title VII.86
In DeCintio, seven male respiratory therapists sued the Westches-
ter County Medical Center claiming sexual discrimination when pro-
motion requirements were created to disqualify them for the position
of Assistant Chief Respiratory Therapist.87 The plaintiffs alleged that
their supervisor, in order to ensure that the woman with whom he was
romantically involved was given the promotion, only considered those
applicants who were certified by a specific professional organization.88
Since the favored woman was the only applicant who had the certifica-
tion, the plaintiffs alleged the requirement was pretextual. 89
At trial, the district court found that defendant had violated both
the Equal Pay Act 90 and Title VII.91 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed both claims. 92 In rejecting the Title VII claim, the court of
appeals refused to follow King to the extent that King "can be inter-
preted as recognizing Title VII claims for non gender-based sex dis-
crimination" because that interpretation would extend Title VII
protection too broadly. 93
Noting the limited legislative history available to guide in inter-
preting the scope of the Act's definition of "sex," 94 the Second Circuit
looked to the other categories afforded protection under Title VII for
85. 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987).
86. Id. at 308.
87. Id. at 305.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 306. The plaintiffs had originally filed a complaint with the EEOC based on
the same allegations, but the EEOC referred their complaint to the New York State Divi-
sion on Human Rights to review the merits of the case. Following an investigation by the
state, the complaint was dismissed for lack of credible evidence that the certification re-
quirement was pretextual. The EEOC then adopted this finding. Id. Plaintiffs tried again
by filing a suit in the district court alleging violations of both Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act. Id.
90. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1988)).
91. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id. at 307.
94. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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guidance in interpreting the scope of the word "sex" under Title VII.95
Since the other categories refer to a person's status as a member of a
particular race, color, religion, or nationality, "'sex' when read in this
context, logically could only refer to membership in a class delineated
by gender, rather than sexual activity regardless of gender. '96
To support this interpretation, the court cited Trans World Air-
lines v. Hardison,97 in which the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he em-
phasis of both the language and the legislative history of [Title VII] is
on eliminating discrimination in employment; similarly situated em-
ployees are not to be treated differently solely because they differ with
respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."9 8 Therefore,
the Second Circuit reasoned that the proscribed differentiation under
Title VII must be a distinction based on a person's sex, and not on a
person's sexual affiliations. 99 Since the court in King had implicitly
recognized a Title VII suit alleging discrimination premised on a vol-
untary romantic relationship, the court viewed this interpretation of
the word "sex" as improper and refused to adopt it.100 "We can ad-
duce no justification for defining 'sex,' for Title VII purposes, so
broadly as to include an ongoing, voluntary, romantic engagement."'' o
In dismissing the claim, the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
reliance on Section 1604.11(g), 10 2 which the court in King cited for
support, because it found that "[t]he word 'submission'... clearly in-
volves a lack of consent and implies a necessary element of coercion
or harassment."' 0 3 The court further reasoned:
[The defendant's] conduct, although unfair, simply did not violate
Title VII .... [The plaintiffs] were not prejudiced because of their
status as males; rather, they were discriminated against because
Ryan preferred his paramour. Appellees faced exactly the same
predicament as that faced by any woman applicant for the promo-
95. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
98. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306 (quoting Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 71).
99. Id. at 306-07. The court later cited several cases that limited the word "sex" to its
traditional definition and refused to extend Title VII proscriptions beyond gender-based
discrimination. Id. at 307; see Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984)
(transsexuality), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748
(8th Cir. 1982) (same); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979)
(homosexuality); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (effeminacy).
100. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307.
101. Id. The court also distinguished Toscano because it involved the granting of sex-
ual favors as a condition to receiving a promotion and, therefore, evidenced a clear viola-
tion of Title VII. Id. Further, the court viewed the claim itself as premised on the coercive
nature of the employer's acts, rather than the relationship between the supervisor and the
favored employee. Id.
102. For a discussion of Section 1604.11(g), see supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
103. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307-08.
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tion: No one but [the favored woman] could be considered for the
appointment because of [her] special relationship to [the
defendant]. 1°4
To accept the plaintiffs' interpretation of Title VII prohibitions against
sex discrimination would "involve the EEOC and federal courts in the
policing of intimate relationships. Such a course, founded on a distor-
tion of the meaning of the word 'sex' in the context of Title VII, is
both impracticable and unwarranted.' 10 5 Additionally, the court
noted the EEOC's indication that "sexual relationships between co-
workers should not be subject to Title VII scrutiny, so long as they are
personal, social relationships."' 1 6
(5) Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America
Following the lead of the DeCintio case, the district court in
Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America'0 7 rejected a Title VII sexual fa-
voritism claim. In Miller, plaintiff was demoted from unit supervisor
to product technician. 08 After a year, the company decided to termi-
nate one of its two product technician positions. 0 9 Citing poor per-
formance, the company told plaintiff she would be terminated at the
end of the year." 0 Plaintiff sued under Title VII, claiming that the
other product technician was favored because of her romantic rela-
tionship with the plant manager."' The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant because plaintiff failed to prove
either that job benefits were conditioned upon submission to the man-
ager's sexual advances," 2 or that the relationship between the man-
ager and plaintiff's co-worker was nonconsensual." 3
Following DeCintio, the court held that preferential treatment
based on a consensual romantic relationship between a supervisor and
an employee is not gender-based discrimination for purposes of Title
VII.114 "Male employees[ ] shared with the plaintiff the same disad-
104. Id. at 308.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Preamble to Interim Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed. Reg.
25,024 (1980)).
107. 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
108. Id. at 497.
109. Id. at 498.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. This would form the basis of a claim under a quid pro quo theory of liability. For
further discussion of this type of Title VII violation, see supra text accompanying notes 19-
22.
113. A nonconsensual underlying relationship is required for a claim supported by Sec-
tion 1604.11(g). For further discussion of this type of liability, see infra text accompanying
notes 130-131.
114. Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 501.
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vantage relative [to the favored woman]: none could claim the special
place in [the supervisor's] heart that [the favored woman] occupied.
Favoritism and unfair treatment, unless based on a prohibited classifi-
cation, do not violate Title VII."115
(6) Broderick v. Ruder
A more recent Title VII claim of sexual favoritism arose in Brod-
erick v. Ruder."6 Plaintiff Broderick was a staff attorney with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission." 7 She argued that numerous
instances of sexual misconduct created a hostile work environment."18
Although the evidence showed that Section 1604.11(g) was violated
because preferential treatment was given to those who submitted to
sexual advances, the plaintiff had only asserted claims for hostile work
environment sexual harassment and wrongful retaliation in her plead-
ings."19 The district court acknowledged that a hostile work environ-
ment claim is actionable under Title VII, and recognized in dicta that
Title VII is also violated when preferential treatment is afforded to
those employees who submit to sexual advances. °20 Despite citations
to King, Toscano, Priest, and Section 1604.11(g), the court finally
based its decision solely on the fact that the sexual conduct was so
pervasive that it created a hostile work environment that "affected the
motivation and work performance of those who found such conduct
repugnant and offensive.'121
(7) Summary
Although four of the six reported decisions involving claims cen-
tered on preferential treatment granted relief to the plaintiff, only
one, King, contained facts where the supervisor favored the woman
with whom he was allegedly involved in a consensual and romantic
relationship. 2 2 The other three cases correctly granted relief to the
plaintiff, but for reasons not supporting a claim of sexual favoritism in
which the challenged relationship is consensual and free of coercion.
The DeCintio and Miller decisions correctly denied relief to the plain-
tiff where a consensual romantic relationship with a supervisor existed
and where that supervisor did not harass other employees.
115. Id.
116. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
117. Id. at 1270.
118. Id at 1273.
119. Id. at 1270.
120. Id. at 1277 (citing King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Priest v.
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571,581 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199
(D. Del. 1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993)).
121. Id at 1278.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
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D. EEOC Policy Guidance
Subsequent to these six decisions, the EEOC issued its 1990 Pol-
icy Guidance on employer liability for sexual favoritism.'23 In ad-
dressing sexual favoritism, the EEOC split the subject into three
categories: (1) isolated instances of favoritism, (2) favoritism based
on coerced sexual conduct, and (3) widespread instances of
favoritism.124
Adopting the rationale of the DeCintio and Miller decisions, the
EEOC took the position that situations under the first category (i.e.,
isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual
and romantic relationships) were not prohibited under Title VII.125
The EEOC determined that while sexual favoritism may be unfair, it
does not violate Title VII because both men and women are disadvan-
taged for reasons other than gender. 126
Where the favoritism is based upon the second category-co-
erced sexual conduct-two forms of liability under Title VII may
arise. 127 The first form of liability is implicit quid pro quo harassment,
where an employer requires female employees to grant sexual favors
in order to advance in the workplace, and such a condition is not im-
posed on men.128 In this case, female employees who were qualified
for benefits, but were denied them, could recover if they established
that sexual relations were made a condition for receiving the bene-
fit.129 The second form of Title VII liability for favoritism based upon
coercive sexual conduct is derivative quid pro quo harassment. 130 This
form of liability arises where the supervisor is interested in only one
woman, the one whom he coerced and thereafter promoted. In this
case, both male and female employees have standing to challenge the
favoritism derivatively, asserting injury based on the discrimination
leveled against the one woman who was coerced. 13'
123. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9.
124. Id. at D-1 to D-2.
125. Id. at D-1.
126. Id.
127. Id. at D-1 to D-2.
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993). The EEOC cited Toscano as a case involv-
ing implicit quid pro quo liability because, although the favored employee consented to the
relationship with her supervisor, there was evidence that the supervisor also made proposi-
tions and unwelcome sexual advances to other women. Thus, the granting of sexual favors
was an implicit condition to receiving job benefits. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9,
at D-1.
129. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9, at D-1.
130. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993).
131. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9, at D-1 to D-2 (citing DeCintio v. Westches-
ter County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[P]laintiffs' claims of favorit-
ism were rejected not because of lack of standing, but because the woman who received
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In the third category-where favoritism based upon the granting
of sexual favors is widespread in the workplace-the EEOC took the
position that both male and female employees may sue under a hostile
work environment theory of harassment.132 These claims would be
valid regardless of whether the conduct is directed towards the com-
plaining employees or whether the favored employees were
coerced.133
E. Summary
The Code of Federal Regulations outline two types of harassment
actionable under Title VII: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work
environment harassment. These two types of harassment have cre-
ated little controversy. However, a third situation, where employment
benefits are given to one in a consensual relationship with an em-
ployer,134 has created a split in the circuit courts. Early cases dealing
with this situation referred to Section 1604.11(g) in allowing claims of
sexual favoritism.135 However, more recent cases have generally al-
lowed liability premised on Section 1604.11(g) only where the under-
lying relationship is coercive. 136 The 1990 EEOC Policy Guidelines
support this view.137
the favorable treatment was not coerced into submitting to sexual advances."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 825 (1987)).
132. Id. at D-2.
133. Id. The EEOC also noted that this type of situation, which gives the message to
women that sexual relationships are necessary to get ahead, would also form the basis of an
implicit quid pro quo harassment claim for female employees. Id. The EEOC cited Brod-
erick as an example of a fact situation which could form the basis for either a hostile envi-
ronment or implicit quid pro quo theory of liability. Id.
134. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1993).
135. King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (male chief medical officer at jail
hired a woman he was romantically involved with as supervisory forensic-clinical nurse);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988) (male SEC supervisor discriminated
against female staff attorney); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (male
employer sexually harassed waitress working in his restaurant); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F.
Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983) (male supervisor awarded promotion to a woman with whom he
had had a sexual encounter).
136. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (male
program administrator hired a woman he was romantically involved with as assistant
chief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495
(W.D. Penn. 1988) (male plant manager accused of sex discrimination against female unit
supervisor).
137. See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9.
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H. Van Tol Article
In a 1991 article,138 Professor Joan E. Van Tol argues that sexual
favoritism 139 should be actionable under Title VII as a distinct form of
sexual harassment. Professor Van Tol asserts that the "theoretical ba-
ses for sexual favoritism and sexual harassment are so similar that
preferential treatment in the workplace based on sexual favoritism"
should be treated as a form of employment discrimination for pur-
poses of Title VII. 140 Van Tol premises her argument on the fact that
sexual harassment, including sexual favoritism, is cognizable under Ti-
tle VII as sexual discrimination because in the employment context
harassment involves the expression of power based on sex. As sup-
port, Van Tol refers to the Supreme Court's Meritor Savings Bank de-
cision, arguing that the Court, in allowing Title VII protection against
a hostile work environment, sought to expand Title VII's protective
ambit. Van Tol argues the post-Meritor Savings Bank cases and the
EEOC have taken an overly restrictive view of sexual harassment.
Requiring the underlying relationship to be coercive, Van Tol posits,
ignores the impact of consensual sexual relationships on the
workforce and places an unfair burden on the plaintiff. Moreover,
Van Tol argues linking sexual favoritism to hostile work environment
harassment ignores the effects of isolated instances of favoritism in
the workplace. Instead, the courts and the EEOC need to recognize
that sexual favoritism is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by
Title VII.
A. Professor Van Tol's Premise
Van Tol begins her Article with an analysis of three distinct per-
spectives on sexual harassment in the workplace: the feminist, the or-
ganizational, and the legal perspective. After detailing these three
divergent perspectives, Van Tol concludes that while they result in dif-
ferent definitions of sexual harassment, "one factor remains constant
in the definitions-the concept of power.' 4' Van Tol argues that
since "sex discrimination occurs when 'sex is for no legitimate reason
a substantial factor in the discrimination,""' 42 then "sexual harassment
138. Van Tol, supra note 10.
139. Van Tol defines sexual favoritism as "the preferential treatment of an employee
because that employee granted sexual favors to the employer." Id. at 162 (emphasis ad-
ded). To the extent that the use of the word "grant" connotes that the employer condi-
tioned job benefits on the "granting" of sexual favors, which would form an implicit quid
pro quo claim under § 1604.11(a)(1), her definition is broader than that of this Note. This
Note solely explores claims of favoritism in which the underlying relationship is consensual
and romantic and no conditions have been placed on the favored employee.
140. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 156.
141. Id. at 159-60.
142. Id. (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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is sex discrimination because the expression of power is, for no legiti-
mate reason, based on sex."143 This leads Van Tol to the conclusion
that sexual favoritism is a form of sexual harassment prohibited by
Title VII because it also involves the expression of power based on sex
in the employment arena. Preferential treatment of sexually compli-
ant workers imposes a sexual standard that undermines the integrity
of the workplace. 144 Thus, "sexual favoritism is sex discrimination
when the preferential treatment of a sexually compliant worker disad-
vantages those otherwise qualified workers who refuse to 'trade in
sexual currency." ' 145
B. Professor Van Tol's Interpretation of Meritor Savings Bank
Professor Van Tol maintains that the Supreme Court's Meritor
Savings Bank decision lends support to her argument that sexual har-
assment should be expanded to include sexual favoritism in the work-
place. She notes that the Court in Meritor Savings Bank employed a
two-step analysis to define sexual harassment, first examining the type
of conduct involved, and then determining the effect of this con-
duct.' 46 In applying this first step to sexual favoritism, the Meritor
Savings Bank Court included the types of conduct that the EEOC had
already determined to be actionable under Title VII.147 Because of
this, Van Tol argues that "[n]either the tone nor the language of the
Court's holding indicated an intention to exclude other acts of sexual
misconduct in the workplace which might violate Title VII." 48 As for
the second step-the effects of the sexual misconduct on the work-
place-Van Tol argues that the Court could have restricted its analysis
to the more common quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment, but
"chose instead to recognize the validity of the plaintiff's hostile envi-
ronment claim and thus give victims of sexual harassment an addi-
tional avenue of recourse' u 49 Since the Court's language never
showed an intention to exclude other acts of sexual misconduct, and
because the effects resulting from sexual favoritism are just as offen-
sive as the hostile work environment harassment recognized in
Meritor Savings Bank, Van Tol argues that the decision supports an
143. Id. at 161.
144. Id. at 161-62.
145. Id. at 162.
146. Id. at 177 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
147. For a discussion of the types of conduct provided for by the EEOC and codified at
§ 1604.11, see infra text accompanying notes 17-27, 41-42.
148. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 177.
149. Id. at 178 (citing Jill W. Hencken, Hostile Environment Claims of Sexual Harass-
ment: The Continuing Expansion of Sexual Harassment Law, 34 ViLL. L. REv. 1243, 1263
(1989)).
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expansion of sexual harassment which recognizes sexual favoritism as
a violation of Title VII.15°
C. Professor Van Tol's Criticism of the 1990 EEOC Policy Guidance and
the DeCintio and Miller Decisions
Van Tol criticizes the DeCintio and Miller decisions and the
EEOC Policy Guidance, asserting that they misinterpret the Court's
decision in Meritor Savings Bank and take too narrow a view of sexual
harassment. 151 Van Tol posits that because of this misinterpretation of
the Meritor Savings Bank decision, the EEOC and the DeCintio and
Miller decisions' 52 erroneously recognized only those sexual favorit-
ism claims which arise either under a derivative quid pro quo or hos-
tile work environment theory of liability. 53
(1) The Exclusion of Consensual Relationships from Title VII Liability
According to Van Tol, limiting sexual favoritism claims to the de-
rivative quid pro quo theory of liability, thereby requiring the underly-
ing relationship to be nonconsensual, ignores the impact that
consensual sexual relationships can have on the workplace. 54 Thus,
shielding employers who enter into consensual relationships with em-
ployees from Title VII actions sends co-workers the same message
that victims of direct sexual harassment receive: that they must use
150. Id. at 177-78.
151. Id. at 177.
152. DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Penn.
1988).
153. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 178. For a discussion of the EEOC's treatment of sex-
ual favoritism claims as either derivative quid pro quo or hostile work environment theo-
ries of liability in the EEOC Policy Guidance, see supra text accompanying notes 123-133.
Van Tol fails to point out that claims of sexual favoritism may also be cognizable under
Title VII via either an explicit (see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993)) or implicit (see 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)) quid pro quo theory of liability. For a discussion of explicit
and implicit quid pro quo theories of liability, see supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
154. Id. at 178. In her Article, Van Tol cited a study showing office romances to be
widespread, and that these romances lead to the perception that supervisors involved in
relationships tend to favor their paramour over other employees. In addition, over two-
thirds surveyed agreed that these relationships caused "much gossip," and one-third said
these relationships created complaints and gripes and caused hostilities. Id. at 162-65 (cit-
ing Robert E. Quinn, Coping with Cupid: The Formation, Impact, and Management of
Romantic Relationships in Organizations, ADMIN. SCI. Q., Mar. 1977, at 30, reprinted in
SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONs: ROMANTIC AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS 38, 42 (Dail Am
Neugarten & Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1980)). The purpose of this Note is not to refute that
instances of sexual favoritism have a negative impact on the workplace, but rather to argue
that with regard to sex discrimination Title VII was enacted only to displace gender-based
discrimination from the workplace.
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their sexuality to advance in the workplace.155 Van Tol concludes that
sexual harassment should be "prohibited by Title VII regardless of the
nature of the underlying relationship": 56
It is the imposition of a sexual standard, not the nature of the rela-
tionship from which the standard originates, which should give rise
to a claim of sexual favoritism. It is the use of this sexual standard
to the disadvantage of other equally qualified workers which is the
gravamen of the sexual favoritism claim.157
(2) Plaintiffs Are Unfairly Burdened
Van Tol also argues that the derivative quid pro quo interpreta-
tion of Section 1604.11(g) outlined by the EEOC and the DeCintio
and Miller courts (i.e., an interpretation of "submission" allowing
third parties to recover only where an individual has been coerced by
an employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors), is "re-
pugnant" because it requires a plaintiff to prove both the existence of
a sexual relationship between the decision maker and the promoted
employee, and coercion of the promoted employee.' 58 Proof of coer-
cion, she argues, is virtually impossible for a third party plaintiff with-
out the cooperation of the promoted employee, and it is "unlikely that
a worker who has been advantaged by a workplace relationship would
provide evidence of coercion."'- 9 Furthermore, according to Van Tol,
inquiring into the details of the underlying relationship forces the
EEOC and the courts to do what the court in DeCintio refused to
allow-"the policing of intimate relationships.' 60
(3) The Unnecessarily Restrictive Interpretation of Section 1604.11(g)
In addition, Van Tol argues that this restrictive interpretation of
Section 1604.11(g) is not required. She notes that the supplementary
information accompanying the final amendments to the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations refers to the "'question of whether a third party who
was denied an employment benefit would have a charge cognizable
under Title VII where the benefit was received by a person who was
granting sexual favors to their mutual supervisor.""161 According to
Van Tol, "the common meaning of the word grant does not connote
155. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 178-79.
156. Id. at 179.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987)). For a further discussion of the DeCintio
decision, see supra text accompanying notes 85-106.
161. Id. at 180 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676-77 (1980)).
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coercion";162 thus the restrictive interpretation of Section 1604.11(g)
emphasized by both the DeCintio and Miller courts and the EEOC
Policy Guidance is unjustified. Instead, Van Tol asserts that the provi-
sions of Section 1604.11(g) could "apply equally to underlying rela-
tionships which are not coercive."' 163 To support this contention, Van
Tol notes that the EEOC previously opined that "section 1604.11(g)
applies with equal force to a situation in which the acquiescence of the
other female to her employer's request for sexual favors was consen-
sual, as in this case. Section 1604.11(g) draws no distinction between
'unwelcome' as opposed to consensual behavior."'1 64 The above inter-
pretation, according to Van Tol, is more consistent with the "avowed
purpose of subsection (g), which is to create a 'balance of protection
of all persons in the workplace' and 'afford protection for persons who
are not involved in the situation but who, nevertheless, are adversely
affected by the sexual conduct of others."' 65
(4) The Linking of Sexual Favoritism with Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment
Finally, Professor Van Tol denounces the EEOC's linking of sex-
ual favoritism claims to Meritor Savings Bank's hostile work environ-
ment theory of liability.166  By employing the hostile work
environment standard and requiring that there be widespread favorit-
ism, she argues, the EEOC fails to recognize that even an isolated
instance of favoritism can affect a condition of employment within the
meaning of Title VII.' 67 The Meritor Savings Bank standard is appro-
priate in cases of environmental sexual harassment, but is misplaced in
a case of sexual favoritism where workers can be directly disadvan-
taged by a single act of sexual favoritism.168 As Van Tol notes, "The
type of harm alleged in most cases of sexual favoritism is more akin to
a quid pro quo claim of harassment in which there is 'economic or
tangible discrimination. '"1 69
162. Id. Van Tol notes that the definition of "grant" is "to agree or assent to." Id. at
180 n.159 (citing WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 989 (3d ed. 1981)).
163. Id. at 180.
164. Id. (quoting Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at A40, 46, DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-1946) (opinion of the EEOC in Matter
of the Request to Reopen by United States Postal Service, Request No. 05830088 (Oct. 8,
1982))).
165. Id. (quoting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: Hearings Before the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 341, 342 (1981) (testimony of J. Clay
Smith, Acting Commissioner of the EEOC)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 180-81.
169. Id. at 181 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
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D. Summary
In summary, Van Tol believes that sexual favoritism is a form of
sexual harassment cognizable under Title VII because it involves the
expression of power based on sex as a factor in an employment deci-
sion. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank
gave an expansive definition of sexual harassment, this decision lends
support to her argument that sexual favoritism is a form of liability
under Title VII. In Van Tol's view, the EEOC and DeCintio and
Miller decisions have misinterpreted the Court's expansion of sexual
harassment leading to a narrow construction of Title VII with respect
to sexual favoritism. This restrictive interpretation has led the EEOC
and courts to require either coercion or widespread favoritism for
there to be a valid Title VII claim; this both ignores the impact that
consensual sexual relationships have on the workplace and fails to rec-
ognize that even one instance of favoritism can affect a condition of
employment. Instead, the EEOC and the courts need to re-examine
the narrow definition of sexual harassment and recognize that sexual
favoritism is sexual harassment, and therefore sexual discrimination
for purposes of Title VII.
1H. Response to Van Tol
Although Professor Van Tol's arguments highlight the potential
unfairness of workplace sexual favoritism, they do not lead to the con-
clusion that the EEOC position and the DeCintio and Miller decisions
are incorrect. The refusal to treat sexual favoritism as a distinct form
of sexual harassment, and instead to allow sexual favoritism claims
only when based on derivative quid pro quo and hostile work environ-
ment theories, comports with the intent and language of Title VII as
well as Supreme Court cases interpreting the statute, all of which re-,
quire that liability arise only where there are instances of gender-
based discrimination.
A. Refuting the Power Premise
Van Tol mistakenly criticizes the EEOC and the DeCintio and
Miller decisions' requirement that sexual favoritism claims be based
on a derivative quid pro quo or hostile work environment theory of
liability. She asserts that sexual harassment is sexual discrimination
because sexual harassment involves the expression of power which is,
for no legitimate reason, based on sex.170 From this proposition, Van
Tol concludes that sexual favoritism is also sexual harassment, and
170. Id. at 161.
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therefore cognizable under Title VII, because sexual favoritism also
involves the expression of power based on sex. 171
Van Tol's argument is flawed. Even if sexual harassment is sexual
discrimination because the harassment is an expression of power
based on sex, it does not follow that sexual favoritism is another form
of sexual harassment cognizable under Title VII. In a sexual favorit-
ism claim where the underlying relationship is consensual there is no
expression of power based on gender. In cases of sexual favoritism
none of the parties involved-neither the favored employee nor any
third party-are being discriminated against because of their gender.
Only in cases where the underlying relationship is coercive, and serves
as a condition on employment, is there evidence of an expression of
power based on gender. Thus, while the expression of power may be
a factor in determining whether harassment is sexual discrimination,
the dispositive question is whether this expression of power involves
gender-based discrimination. Since sexual favoritism claims do not in-
volve gender-based discrimination, regardless of whether the prefer-
ential treatment is an inappropriate expression of power, they are not
forms of sexual discrimination cognizable under Title VII.
In prohibiting "discriminat[ion] against any individual ...be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin,"'1 72 Title VII prohibits discrimination that is based on an
immutable characteristic. In the case of race, the statute is intended
to strike at disparate treatment of employees based on their inclusion
in a particular race.173 Similarly, with respect to sex, the statute is
intended to prohibit disparate treatment of employees because they
are of a particular sex. In prohibiting "sex" discrimination, the word
"sex" in Title VII refers to gender. 174 Thus, when a plaintiff sues
under Title VII alleging sexual discrimination, the plaintiff must prove
employment discrimination based on gender. 175
B. An Erroneous View of Meritor Savings Bank
In attacking the EEOC and recent court cases involving claims of
sexual favoritism, Professor Van Tol argues that Meritor Savings Bank
supports an expanded theory of sexual harassment which would rec-
ognize claims of sexual favoritism. 176 However, Van Tol's interpreta-
171. Id. at 161-62.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
173. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding affirm-
ative action plan preferring black employees); supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that
employee's sex is appropriately taken into account when determining promotions); see also
supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
175. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
176. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 177; see supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
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tion of Meritor Savings Bank is misguided because the Court's
decision and underlying purpose in Meritor Savings Bank was not as
broad and expansive as Van Tol asserts with respect to sexual harass-
ment. The Court's purpose in Meritor Savings Bank was simply to
expand Title VII's prohibition against sexual discrimination in order
to include claims of sexual harassment involving noneconomic inju-
ries. Before Meritor Savings Bank, Title VII had only been recog-
nized as prohibiting sexual discrimination which affected a "term,
condition[,] or privilege[ ] of employment."' 77 In Meritor Savings
Bank, because the claim of hostile work environment did not involve
a term, condition, or privilege of employment that would be an eco-
nomic injury, the defendant argued that Title VII did not apply. Thus,
the clear task before the Court was to confront Title VII sexual dis-
crimination claims involving noneconomic injuries.
This is precisely the issue the Court addressed. As Professor Van
Tol notes, the Court in Meritor Savings Bank could have simply de-
cided the case on the previously recognized quid pro quo theory of
sexual harassment.'78 Instead, the Court accepted the plaintiffs hos-
tile work environment theory and rejected the defendant's argument
that Congress intended Title VII to prohibit only the tangible and eco-
nomic barriers created by sexual discrimination. 179 "[T]he language of
Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The
phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' evinces a con-
gressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women' in employment."' 80
Therefore, although the Court was seeking to expand Title VII's
prohibition against sexual discrimination to include hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment, thereby "giv[ing] victims of sexual harass-
ment an additional avenue of recourse,"' 8 this expansion remained
within the scope of discrimination based on gender. Nowhere in the
decision did the Court either explicitly or implicitly state that harass-
ment regardless of gender is prohibited by Title VII. Rather, the
Court indicated the importance of gender when it prefaced its accept-
ance of the plaintiff's theory of sexual harassment by stating, "With-
out question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on
the basis of sex."'18 The Court further stated, "Since the Guidelines
[codified at Code of Federal Regulations Section 1604.11] were issued,
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
178. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 177.
179. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
180. Id. (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))
(emphasis added).
181. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 178.
182. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
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courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may estab-
lish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex
has created a hostile or abusive work environment. 1 83
Thus, as all of these statements show, the Court was simply ex-
panding Title VII's coverage to include gender-based harassment
which leads to "noneconomic injury"'184 but not to expand it in order
to include harassment regardless of gender.
C. The DeCintio and Miller Decisions and the EEOC Policy Guidance
Have Properly Interpreted Section 1604.11(g)
The EEOC Policy Guidance and the DeCintio and Miller deci-
sions have correctly restricted sexual favoritism claims to either the
derivative quid pro quo or hostile work environment theories of liabil-
ity because, as both Title VII and Supreme Court cases interpreting
the statute require, these theories of liability are premised upon gen-
der-based discrimination. The derivative quid pro quo claim adopted
in the EEOC Policy Guidance allows both male and female co-work-
ers, such as Patty and Peter in the introductory hypothetical, to sue
even when a supervisor, such as David, is interested in only one wo-
man.185 A plaintiff who can establish that the favored woman, such as
Theresa, was coerced into the relationship can challenge the favorit-
ism by showing injury resulted from the discrimination leveled against
the coerced employee. 86 This is consistent with both Meritor Savings
Bank and Title VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination be-
cause, in these claims, the sex-based discrimination is being directed at
the favored woman coerced into the relationship. The favored woman
faces gender-based discrimination because, but for her sex, she would
not be coerced into granting sexual favors for job benefits. Although
the claimants in these situations are not directly discriminated against
because of their gender, the favored woman does face discrimination.
Thus, the EEOC allows those employees who are denied job benefits
given to the coerced woman to sue derivatively for the gender-based
discrimination. 87 Since these claimants derive their standing from the
gender-based discrimination leveled against the favored woman, they
are consistent with Title VII.
Van Tol also argues that requiring sexual favoritism claims to be
based on a derivative quid pro quo theory of liability, which requires
the underlying relationship to be coercive, is wrong for two reasons:
183. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 65.
185. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9, at D-1 to D-2.
186. Id.
187. Of course, the woman coerced may also sue the employer for quid pro quo harass-
ment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1993); supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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(1) because the coercion requirement ignores the impact that even
consensual sexual relationships can have on the workplace;8 8 and (2)
because coercion is virtually impossible for a third-party plaintiff to
prove without the cooperation of the favored woman.18 9 These
changes are addressed in turn below.
(1) Isolated Consensual Relationships Should Be Ignored
In arguing that the coercion requirement ignores the impact that
consensual sexual relationships, such as the relationship between
David and Theresa in the introductory hypothetical, have on the
workplace, Van Tol asserts that co-workers, such as Patty and Peter,
are disadvantaged by these relationships. According to Van Tol, this
is because the message is given that in order to advance in the work-
place they must "use" or "surrender" their sexuality.190 Because this
message is just as offensive to a worker who is not the direct recipient
of the harassment, it should be prohibited by Title VII.19' Moreover,
Van Tol argues, the imposition of a sexual standard, not the nature of
the relationship from which the standard originates, should give rise to
a sexual favoritism claim.19
Van Tol's argument that the imposition of a sexual standard, and
not the nature of the underlying relationship, gives rise to a sexual
favoritism claim is flawed. The nature of the underlying relationship
must be examined because it determines whether the sexual standard
imposed is based on gender. If the underlying relationship is not
based on coercion, and the supervisor is not making sexual advances
towards other employees, no one involved is being discriminated
against because of their gender. If no one is facing gender-based dis-
crimination, then there can be no Title VII liability.
To broaden Title VII to encompass sexual relationships would
create contradictions in the law. Suppose David, in the introductory
hypothetical, is merely in a close and platonic relationship with The-
resa when he promotes her to assistant branch manager. In such a
situation there could be no Title VII violation since there is no dis-
crimination leveled against anyone, either Theresa or her co-workers.
However, should David and Theresa go a step further and become
sexually intimate, Van Tol would argue that Title VII is implicated.
Yet, nothing has changed in either of the scenarios with respect to
discrimination based on sex since neither scenario involves any gen-
der-based discrimination. Theresa is not facing any gender-based dis-
188. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 178.
189. Id. at 179.
190. Id at 178-79.
191. Id. at 179.
192. I.
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crimination since she is involved in a relationship with a man whom
she loves. Similarly, neither Patty nor Peter, the plaintiffs in the intro-
ductory hypothetical, are facing any gender-based discrimination.
Neither was denied the promotion because of their gender; they were
denied because David preferred Theresa, his friend in the first exam-
ple and his lover in the second.
The fallacy of an approach founded on the expression of power
based on sex-as opposed to an approach which asks whether the un-
derlying relationship is coercive-is also apparent when one considers
the application of Title VII relief to a hypothetical where a supervisor,
like David, promotes his homosexual lover. In such a situation, there
is the expression of power based on sex, which Van Tol views as dis-
positive. Yet, the favored employee in no way faces gender-based dis-
crimination, and neither do any of the employees denied the
promotion.
The above examples show that to focus on the expression of
power based on sex does nothing to assist in determining whether the
preferential treatment involves gender-based discrimination. Rather,
the appropriate guide is to examine the underlying relationship to de-
termine whether the favored employee has been subjected to gender-
based discrimination. If the underlying relationship involves people
of the opposite sex, and if it is shown that the favored employee was
coerced, then he or she has faced discrimination based on sex.
As for Van Tol's concern that a message is given that to advance
in the workplace women must "use" or "surrender" their sexuality,
this concern is addressed by the implicit and derivative quid pro quo,
as well as widespread favoritism, theories of liability. Under an im-
plicit quid pro quo theory of liability a woman may sue under Title
VII if she can establish that the supervisor, such as David, proposi-
tioned other female employees. In this case there would be an im-
plicit message that to get a promotion women in the office must sleep
with the supervisor. Under a widespread favoritism theory of liability,
both male and female co-workers can assert a Title VII violation by
showing that the favoritism is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment.'"1 93
(2) The Burden on the Plaintiff Is Fair
Van Tol criticizes the EEOC's coercion requirement as "repug-
nant" because it is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove coercion
without the cooperation of the favored employee. 194 While it may be
193. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 9, at D-2 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
194. Van Tol, supra note 10, at 179.
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true that sufficient proof of coercion is difficult for a plaintiff to pro-
duce, the requirement nonetheless is necessary to keep in line with
Title VII's prohibition against gender-based discrimination. Because
of this, courts should not redefine words in a statute, such as "discrim-
inate .. because of ... sex,"195 just to create an easier burden of
proof for Title VII plaintiffs.
D. Linking Sexual Favoritism to Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment Is Proper
Finally, Van Tol objects to the EEOC's use of the Meritor Savings
Bank standard in cases of widespread favoritism because, she argues,
even one instance of favoritism gives out the message to women that
they must "use" their sexuality to advance in the workplace. How-
ever, it is simply not the case that one instance of favoritism will give
the message to women that they must use their sexuality to succeed.
If the instance between David and Theresa is the only one where an
intimately involved bank employee is promoted by her supervisor,
Patty can not reasonably believe that she will have to sleep with a
supervisor to move up from her bank teller position. Admittedly,
Patty may believe that her chances would be better if she were to
sleep with the person in charge of promotions. However, the same
could be said for anyone, male or female, who develops a close, yet
platonic, relationship with the supervisor, and that situation would not
implicate Title VII.
Moreover, one instance of favoritism does not send out a message
sufficiently coercive that it should give rise to Title VII liability. With
just one instance there is no evidence that other bank supervisors will
do what David did, and nothing suggests that David will do the same
thing again. It is intuitively apparent that it takes a series of instances,
where women involved in intimate relationships with supervisors get
promotions, to produce the message that female employees in the of-
fice must "use" or "surrender" their sexuality to get promoted. If it is
required that a pattern must develop within the bank, then it becomes
much more clear that the bank's supervisors have made it a practice to
promote those employees with whom they are intimately involved.
This practice would then form a reasonable basis for a female em-
ployee to believe that she must "use" or "surrender" her sexuality to
advance. Furthermore, accepting one instance of favoritism as proof
that a message has been given to female employees that they must
sleep to get to the top risks the possibility that a claim will be allowed
in a situation where the supervisor promoted the employee for rea-
sons other than the relationship alone. Instead, requiring a series of
instances of favoritism ensures that when supervisors like David are
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
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promoting their intimate partners they are doing so primarily because
of their relationship with the subordinate.
Conclusion
While the practice of a supervisor promoting an employee with
whom he is romantically involved is unfair to those employees not
chosen for the promotion, this practice is nonetheless outside the pur-
view of Title VII since it does not involve discrimination on the basis
of sex. The EEOC and those courts refusing to recognize claims
based on practices of this type have correctly focused on whether the
challenged relationship is coercive. 196 In making this inquiry, the de-
termination is thereby made as to whether any employees are being
discriminated against because of their gender. Since claims alleging
coercive relationships are the only ones involving an employee dis-
criminated against because of her gender, only they concern the dis-
crimination Title VII was intended to address.' 97 Unless the practice
of favorable treatment by supervisors produces a hostile environ-
ment, 198 those claims involving noncoercive relationships simply do
not fall under Title VII. Even if it is true that all instances of sexual
favoritism have adverse effects upon the workplace, it is up to the
legislature to fashion laws that will prohibit these practices entirely.
For courts to take this action on their own would require them to dis-
tort the only logically consistent meaning of the word "sex" in Title
VII.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 185-187.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 172-175.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 132-133.
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